The Battle for Palermo
By: Tom Frascella June 2015
For purposes of this article I will use an expanded calendar view of Garibaldi’s assault on the Sicilian Capital of Palermo. Expanded in the sense that the actual fighting in the city was confined to just two days May 27th and May 28th. However to fully appreciate the complexity and politics of the confrontation the period of May 25 thru to June 27th must be considered as a whole. The events as they evolved that month shaped the future of both the military and political campaigns in the south and the unification of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with Piedmont-Sardinia. Therefore, given the critical nature of the events it is important to examine the events of that month carefully and in some detail.
At the time of Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily on May 11th and thru the Battle of Calatafemi May 15th the Bourbon forces in Palermo were under the command of Bourbon General Castelcicala. His inability to stop the invasion at its start permitted Garibaldi and the Sicilian insurgents to rapidly gain momentum. Shortly after the Bourbon failure to stop Garibaldi at Calatafemi the Palermo command was reassigned to General Ferdinando Lanza and General Castelcicala was relieved of his Sicilian command. General Lanza had by 1860 had a long and distinguished military career with the Bourbon regime. He had reached the rank of general in the Bourbon army during the 1848 revolt when he was 63 years old. During the 1848 Carbonari uprising in the south General Lanza was able to quickly subdue and restore authority on behalf of the regime. But by the time of his appointment of command in Palermo he was 75 years old. In addition, he was not in good health, obese to the extent that he could not ride a horse. Given his age and poor health he would not seem to be a first choice as a field commander. His appointment underscores the weakness that the Bourbon regime had in competent, young aggressive senior officers.
There is a question as to whether General Lanza’s own personal lack of mobility influenced the tactics that he would come to employ upon being given command at Palermo. In late May General Lanza had about 25,000 troops in and around Palermo and another 15,000 situated in various positions on the eastern side of Sicily. He had a clear advantage numerically in troops, training and weapons. He also had a fleet of Bourbon warships in Palermo harbor. Clearly he could choose between seeking out Garibaldi, bringing the battle to the insurgents or waiting for them to come to him.
For the newly arrived Lanza whether the battle of Calatafemi had been a loss or draw was of little consequence to the reserve of manpower he had available. The loss of a few hundred men did not significantly deplete his reserve. On the positive side the battle itself did provide important intelligence on the size and capabilities of Garibaldi’s Redshirts and the accompanying Sicilian insurgent force. In addition, even General Landi’s retreat to Palermo from Calatafemi had provided intelligence on the degree and type of support among the rural Sicilians Garibaldi could likely muster to his cause. Based upon this intelligence General Lanza put his plan in action.
General Lanza’s preparations prior to Garibaldi’s arrival provide an insight into his analysis of the military situation before him. His major effort in the ten days between the battle at Calatafemi and Garibaldi’s assault on Palermo was not to seek out Garibaldi’s forces in the open countryside. Instead he decided to hunker down in place.
He issued orders to his troops to erect street barricades throughout the city of Palermo. This suggests that he was anticipating an urban uprising in which street to street fighting could be expected. He must have concluded, and rightfully so, that the majority of the force that Garibaldi had with him were native Sicilian and lightly armed. He probably realized that the most effective assault that Garibaldi could muster was from within the city. If Garibaldi mixed his force with those insurgents resident within the city Garibaldi could use the Palermo population as cover and as a resource. Such a situation could escalate and Lanza could be forced into confronting the city’s population as a riotous whole. If that occurred the numerical advantage of a city in revolt would quickly weaken his position. This was something that he needed to avoid.
By focusing on the erection of barricades it is clear that Lanza’s plan was to use the barricades to slow or stop any riotous momentum within the city. This tactic also offered him additional opportunity to funnel the insurgents toward his strong defensive fortifications within the city even if the barricades failed. From his fortifications he could shell the rebels and the city from both his fixed fortifications and from the harbor warships. His hope being that the shelling would discourage and eventually break the resistance of the Palermo civilians who otherwise might be tempted to join the insurgents against the Bourbons.
General Lanza became aware around May 25th that Garibaldi’s forces were approaching the City. General Lanza sent a force, 5,000 men into the surrounding countryside on an intercept mission. Garibaldi however was able to use the terrain and some of his Sicilian squadre under the command of Sicilian Orsini to confuse the Bourbons. Orsini’s mission was to appear as a much larger force, in other words the main force but not engage the Bourbons. In fact, Orsini’s objective was to have the Bourbons chase and follow his men away from the city. While this was taking place Garibaldi and the majority of his force would maneuver around the Bourbon troops undetected and assault the city.
By May 26th everything was in place, 5,000 Bourbon troops were busy chasing Orsini and Garibaldi prepared for his assault to begin. At that point he had gathered 750-1,000 of his redshirt/volunteers, and between 3,000-3500 Sicilians on the outskirts of Palermo. He had also dispatched Sicilian agents into Palermo to alert and organize the insurgents within the city to be prepared to join the assault.
I should also note that one other element was in place that would figure into the battle of Palermo on May 26th. Palermo was a major international port for Mediterranean trade and a port of frequent call for many foreign warships and merchant vessels. On the day that Garibaldi attacked Palermo there were at anchor in the port several British warships commanded by Admiral Mundy. He had moved his warships from Marsala harbor after May 11th and on May 27th these ships lay at anchor in Palermo’s harbor. There was also a Piedmont warship anchored in the harbor. The Piedmont warship commanded by Admiral Persano was able to anchor in port under color of neutrality since there had been no declaration of hostility between Piedmont and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Clearly Piedmont was not neutral but it was maintaining that it was, at the time, that it had nothing to do with Garibaldi’s activities.
There were also French, Austrian and American warships in port. All of these vessels had an opportunity to observe the battle that was about to begin. This meant that there was clear “international” observation and scrutiny of the conduct of the events about to take place. The presence of representatives of so much of the international community meant that the actions taken by the opposing sides would come under international judgment and press through international dispatches.
On the morning of May 27, 1860 Garibaldi’s force of between 3,500-4,000 men entered Palermo through the lightly guarded Porta Termini. There arrival at the lightly guarded post initially allowed them to advance easily into the city but eventually the Bourbon forces began to put up more resistance. What followed was two days of street fighting with the Bourbon troops slowly yielding ground from barricade to street barricade until Garibaldi’s forces had physical control well into the center of the city.
During this two day period both sides seem to have sustained heavy casualties, Garibaldi lost about 600 men and the Bourbon troops probably an equal number. However Garibaldi’s efforts were for all practical purposes stalled as they reached the center of the city. Here they started to come under fire from the fortified artillery positions as well as the Bourbon warships in the harbor.
As hoped and expected Garibaldi’s forces seemed to have gained support from a number if not the majority of the Palermo inhabitants but they were basically unarmed civilians. Garibaldi’s forces had also managed to free about 2,000 political prisoners who also joined in the fighting, again however they were essentially unarmed. So, General Lanza’s tactics were proving effective. Garibaldi could not be sure how the civilian population would react to the bombardment. If they broke and turned on the insurgents all would be lost.
In fact the lack of weapons and ammunition even among Garibaldi’s armed fighters was becoming a critical factor by the end of the second day of fighting. Garibaldi understood that he could not maintain or continue the assault without ammunition. The danger of running out of ammunition if perceived by the enemy opened the possibility to a successful counter attack by General Lanza. If this occurred Garibaldi might be forced to abandon the city in the face of the bombardment and counter attack. Garibaldi was fully aware of his predicament.
However it is at that precise moment that events took a strange turn. History and facts of this conflict become inexplicable and difficult to accurately evaluate. As Garibaldi’s munitions were almost exhausted a messenger arrived from General Lanza. Some histories indicate that Bourbon General Lanza offered to negotiate a 24 hour halt to attend to the wounded and dead on his own initiative. Others, suggest that the cease fire was urged by Admiral Mundy under veiled threat of intervention to protect British citizens in the city. At any rate just as Garibaldi’s men were facing a serious ammunition shortage word of the proposed offer of a ceasefire arrived at Garibaldi’s headquarters in the center of Palermo. Garibaldi was of course most interested in a ceasefire as it would give him additional time to scrounge up resources. In Garibaldi’s own words from “My Life” page 102;
“So Lanza decided to make a series of proposals to me, the first of which concerned the burial of the dead, whose corpses were beginning to decay, and the transfer of the wounded soldiers onto a ship so they could be taken to Naples. A twenty-four hour truce was called to carry this out. By God, we needed one: we were having to make gunpowder and cartridges which were being used up as soon as they were ready.”
In Garibaldi’s writing he is sure to reinforce that he received no physical aid from the “neutral” ships in the port especially from the Piedmont vessel under the command of Admiral Persano. To acknowledge any such help would be to confirm a greater conspiracy of certainly Piedmont but possibly England and France as well. Later histories dispute Garibaldi’s assertion somewhat mentioning for example that a Turkish merchant vessel in the harbor was loaded with gunpowder which Garibaldi purchased. It is also known that Admiral Persano had a considerable purse, in the millions, authorized by the Piedmont regime at his disposal. The histories make no mention as to where the money for the supply purchases came from.
As the ceasefire started to take effect the roughly 20,000 Bourbon troops in Palermo were suddenly reinforced by the arrival of an additional 5,000 Bourbon troops. These were the troops that General Lanza had dispatched two days before Garibaldi’s assault to intercept Garibaldi’s forces. Garibaldi had eluded the Bourbon troops and once they realized this and that Palermo was under attack the Bourbon troops returned to the Capital. Upon assessing the situation the arriving Bourbon troops immediately launched an attack on Garibaldi’s men defending their rear at the Porta Termini. Doing this they effectively entered behind Garibaldi’s forces. By attacking they also inadvertently ended the ceasefire. Garibaldi was aware that he was now squeezed between the two Bourbon positions and that his position was in trouble, even more so because of the lack of ammunition. In his own words Garibaldi describes the aggressive attack by these returning Bourbon troops;
“They approached the capital livid with rage and launched a fierce attack at Porta Termini. The few forces I had at my disposal were scattered all over the city; it was unlikely that there would be enough men to stop the enemy pouring in. Nevertheless the few men who were in the area round Porta Termini put up a brave defence, and though they were forced to withdraw as far as Fiera Vecchia, they fought every inch of the way.” “My Life” page 102
Just as Garibaldi was gathering additional men to try to reinforce his rear, word came to him that General Lanza still wanted to negotiate and renew the ceasefire and suggested a meeting aboard the English warship Hannibal. Garibaldi jumped at the chance and the new Bourbon advance was halted under General Lanza’s orders. Initially at the shipboard conference the Bourbon representatives basically asked for a one day ceasefire to attend to wounded, dead and resupply. They then demanded surrender of Garibaldi’s forces and a pledge of obedience to the Bourbon crown which Garibaldi flatly rejected. Ultimately they agreed to the one day ceasefire only.
Although this gave Garibaldi some time to strengthen his defenses and to resupply his men with ammunition it did not improve his tactical position or the fact that he was out gunned. One day simply did not improve the position that Garibaldi found himself. Apparently, Garibaldi himself recognized this after the negotiation aboard H.M.S. Hannibal came close to abandoning the city in favor of the hills and guerilla tactics:
“I have never been subject to discouragement even in circumstances which were perhaps worse than these and I was not discouraged now, but when I considered the enemy’s strength and numbers and compared them with our restricted means, I was somewhat at a loss what to do, whether it was worth persevering with the defence of the city or whether I should assemble all forces and take once more to the open country.” “My Life” page 104
Although, Garibaldi maintained that he decided to remain in Palermo the potential consequence of that decision an assault from the Bourbon’s never materialized. Instead as the resumption of hostilities loomed on May 30th another messenger arrived from General Lanza. The General requested an additional three day extension of the ceasefire as there had been insufficient time for the wounded to be evacuated. This was the time that Garibaldi desperately needed. Not only did the additional time give Garibaldi more time to make ammunition but it allowed Orsini, the artillery piece he had in his possession, his Sicilian squadre and additional squadre reinforcements to come up behind the Bourbons at Porta Termini. The result was that the 5,000 Bourbon troops at Porta termini were now the force that was caught in a vice.
On June 2, 1860 as the three day ceasefire was drawing to a close, General Lanza accepted the invitation of British Admiral Mundy to again negotiate. The negotiation quickly turned into an offer by General Lanza to withdraw the Bourbon forces in Palermo back to the mainland. In essence surrendering the city of Palermo to Garibaldi’s forces. The negotiated terms and conditions of the troop evacuation allowed the Bourbon force to evacuate under arms, which means they could take their weapons with them. Garibaldi for his part had to guarantee the Bourbon troops safety during their evacuation onto Bourbon ships for passage to the mainland. The evacuation was of course to take place under the international scrutiny and protection of the foreign vessels in port.
Apparently, King Francis was aware that his commander in Palermo was preparing to withdraw from the Sicilian capital. As a result on June 2nd he offered the European Powers, England, France Sardinia, Austria and others his guarantee that a firm constitution protecting the civil liberties of the people of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would be enacted. He hoped that such a guarantee could be a condition for the European Powers to in turn guarantee the integrity of the borders of the Kingdom. Such international support would have effectively stalled the rebellion and ultimately allowed the Bourbons to reestablish control over Sicily. King Francis then anxiously waited for the international response.
Garibaldi had won Palermo, but not won Sicily and not won unification. King Francis still sought ways militarily and diplomatically to protect his Kingdom’s sovereignty. Nevertheless this rapid turn of events in Palermo was astounding if not shocking to most observers. It was so shocking in fact that some historians have suggested that General Lanza was enticed to act by virtue of bribes from Piedmont. General Lanza himself claimed that he believed his position was under threat of British and possibly French intervention. Both Nations’ representatives condemned the bombardment as risking the safety of their nationals in the city. This is the same claim, protecting their citizens that the British had raised in Marsala during Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily.
That some communication proceeded between Admiral Mundy and General Lanza on the subject of protecting foreign nationals is confirmed in the personal correspondence between Henry Elliot the British Minister to the Bourbon Court at Naples and Lord John Russell British Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In the June 2, 1860 correspondence Mr. Elliot writes to Lord Russell concerning the actions of Admiral Mundy:
“It is extremely fortunate that the protests of Admiral Mundy against bombardment was not listened to, for if it had been abandoned on that account the success of the insurgents would indubitably have been put on our shoulders, but nevertheless, as it was not listened to … I am delighted that the protest should have been made… I do not feel much fear that the bombardment will be renewed, but it was charming to see how its defence was taken up by the Nuncio who gesticulated in favour of shells and shrapnel, till his purple stockings got almost scarlet with excitement”.
The two issues of interest in the tone of the report above are that the British do not want to be perceived as influencing the outcome of the battle and that they are taking great pleasure in the emasculating of the Bourbon King’s position.
Regardless, of the British perception the capture of Palermo by Garibaldi’s forces so quickly after the landing in Sicily caught most observers by surprise. To that part of the world that was paying attention to the events in Sicily the international reaction can be summarized in the following newspaper dispatch of the London Times June 4, 1860 which was reprinted in many foreign newspapers:
“We publish today news which will gladden the heart of every friend of liberty in Europe. The insurrection in Sicily is fully, and we trust finally victorious! Palermo has been taken by Garibaldi after a terrible struggle. The Neapolitan troops, after being driven from position after position, have at last capitulated, and are to embark, on board the King’s vessels with the usual honors. Garibaldi is now master of the island. In a few days at the furthest the feeble garrisons which have been left in some other towns on the coast will be forced to surrender, and Francis H. will be finally dispossessed of Sicily. Though believing that it was impossible to retain the island under Bourbon domination, we had hardly looked for success so speedy and so complete. In a little more than three weeks from the landing of the Italian chief with a handful of men, this beautiful and long oppressed island is free, and another heavy blow has been given to the fabric of despotism, which is tottering to its fall in Southern and Central Europe. Such feats of arms has seldom been related in history. We have seen so many failures of late years—so many men have sprung forward in the name of liberty and nationality to accomplish great things, have been found wanting in the day of trial, and then fallen forever, that lookers-on may naturally be slow to offer their confidence and admiration to a revolutionary leader. But Garibaldi has taken his place in history as one of the most extraordinary military commanders that this century has produced. He is no longer to be reckoned among those who are aspirins to a great name, who give promise of great achievements, but respecting whom the world must suspend its judgment. His reputation is made, his position is taken, though we hope that his work is not yet done. That genius for war which was first shown in the siege of Rome, and which bewildered the Austrians last year by its vigor and audacity has now broken up the Neapolitan kingdom, and will doubtless end in giving liberty to the whole of Southern Italy. Henceforth Garibaldi will receive not only the sympathy but the full confidence of all who are interested in the Italian cause. He has shown the difference between fool-hardiness and that boldness which, based on accurate calculations, is the highest triumph of military genius. When he landed with his 1,500 men at Marsala he did that which might have exposed him forever to obloquy as a hot headed, enthusiast. He endangered all his past reputation. He abandoned a political position in the Sardinian monarchy which might have contented any man, and began an enterprise which many of those who sympathized with it most deeply looked upon as desperate. It now appears that Garibaldi knew his own powers, the temper of the Sicilian people, and the weakness of the royal authority. The struggle is over, and the tyrants who but one month ago tortured and slaughtered the Sicilians with impunity are now driven from the island, and may perhaps be brought to justice even in the capital of the monarchy.”
Drawing of the Battle for Palermo
The London Times article above, beyond the glorification of Garibaldi who is being raised to almost cult status, is conspicuously devoid of any reference or suggestion to a connection between Garibaldi and the Piedmont regime. This was very carefully crafted propaganda maintaining the deception that Piedmont was not behind this uprising or connected to it. Such articles appearing in the British press were critical to maintaining the public perception that this was a “peoples” revolt against a tyrant regime. Garibaldi is cast as a hero in the cause of liberty not as an agent of political unification or regime change.
Despite the enthusiastic tone of the London reporter, in reality by the June 2nd negotiated withdraw of the Bourbons from Palermo, Garibaldi’s military position and his goal of unification of Italy were at a greater risk of failure than before. Garibaldi and Piedmont were fully aware of that heightened risk and took decisive, if not always coordinated actions to mitigate the risks throughout June of 1860. The reason greater risks were presented with this surprising victory can be explained as it is easier to conquer than to govern.
Following the negotiated withdraw of the Bourbon troops in Palermo Garibaldi once again declared himself ‘dictator” of Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuelle II, and named a provisional government. At this point in the campaign the act of naming a provisional government was entirely necessary, in fact imperative. The insurgents were in theoretical if not actual control of the majority of the island of Sicily and its population of almost 2 million. A civil administration would soon become critical to establish civil order and basic services. While there were many practical reasons to seek greater help from Piedmont, Garibaldi was careful not to declare either the annexation of Sicily to Piedmont or declare a plebiscite on the issue of annexation. This despite the urging to do so by direct urging to do so by La Farina, President of the National Society and Cavour ally.
Garibaldi’s reluctance to announce annexation of Sicily with Piedmont was for him a matter of practical politics. First even though Garibaldi and the insurgents now controlled 80% 0f the island the Bourbon forces on the island still numbered 15,000 and controlled significant assets in eastern Sicily. These forces could at any time be reinforced from the mainland where King Francis had 80,000 to 100,000 men in arms. Second, to show his hand as to Piedmont’s ultimate unification goal would have invited the kind of international scrutiny that Piedmont was still avoiding. The international concern that Austria would again rise to the Bourbon side was ever present.
At the conclusion of the struggle for the capital Garibaldi’s insurgent forces were comprised of about 500 redshirts, 6, 000 Sicilians in Palermo and around 4,500 Sicilian insurgents scattered about the island. In appearance and in fact the revolt was very much a Sicilian dominated action. To reinforce this image the provisional government of the island was, with the exception of Garibaldi as figure head, made up entirely of native Sicilians. These Sicilians however had actually already pledged their loyalty to Piedmont and Victor Emmanuelle II. But, this was Italian politics and fractures between allies and cross purposes could develop at any time.
As I mentioned briefly above, an additional concern was that Garibaldi’s position actually weakened with the added civil responsibility with the taking of Palermo. His government had no money, still faced 15,000 Bourbon troops in the eastern part of the island and had to protect 25,000 Bourbon troops as they withdrew from Palermo. These troops were exposed to possible attacks by the Palermo citizenship and as a result Garibaldi had to keep his 7,000 redshirts and Sicilian insurgents in Palermo. The evacuation was a long process taking from June 3rd to June 20th. So for two and a half weeks Garibaldi was tied to Palermo.
In that two and a half week period there were in addition to the Bourbons troops on the island several very real threats to the peace, first riot, lawlessness and looting had to be contained as well as acts of vengeance against former Bourbon authorities. Civil order is not an easy task. Second, in the absence of real government structure the vacuum of power sometimes results in local power grabs and revolts start to go sideways with unintended consequences. Political factions and fissures develop.
Garibaldi also recognized that many of the Sicilian insurgents who helped him take Palermo did not intend to be soldiers or long term revolutionaries. Most were farmers who had crops to attend and as a result Garibaldi found that many Sicilians volunteers started returning home after the fighting concluded in Palermo. The fact that Garibaldi did not have the resources to pay these men added to the difficulty in keeping them in place. His available forces, as modest and poorly armed as they were began to shrink in numbers while the Bourbon threat continued.
Garibaldi and his Piedmont advisors had to deal with the problem of establishing and holding military authority in favor of Piedmont. The problem was approached in several ways which set a pattern or blueprint for the future Piedmont pacification of the southern territorial regions. First Garibaldi issued a levy for soldiers, recruits to form a national guard, a force designed to be more militia than regular army. But a large enough force to maintain order in the face of civil rather than military threat.
This actually did not go well. Most of the recruits were likely coming from rural Sicily and were farmers or engaged in agriculturally connected occupations. They were needed in the fields and there was a great deal of resistance to the move. In fact Garibaldi had to suspend the levy within a week of issuing it. Eventually in Sicily, National Guard units were recruited. Recruitment for these home guard units centered on a preference for young 14-18, semi-literate or illiterate volunteers who were enthusiastic “nationalists”. These young soldiers could be easily shaped and would be placed under the command of regional Sicilian junior officers, often of Albanian/Sicilian heritage. Again it was important in June to maintain the “Sicilian” identity of the campaign. However, senior officers were intended to be Piedmont regulars. In addition, eventually regular army units, generally originating in the north were employed to both bolster and monitor these local “guarda” forces.
In the early June phase of the Sicilian recruitment there were not enough Piedmont/northern Italian regulars available initially to fill these superior rank roles. Garibaldi had in Sicily until late June only about 500 of his northern volunteers available. However there were still about 6,500 of the original redshirt volunteers still being held back in Genoa together with 15,000 rifles. These could be released to Sicily and still through careful manipulation have it appear not to be orchestrated by Piedmont.
Because King Francis had called on the international community for aid between June 2nd and June 20th the open question for Piedmont and Garibaldi was whether any of the European Powers would agree to intercede. Would they guarantee the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies? The foreign responses slowly emerged and along the expected lines. Piedmont of course had no interest in guarantees of Bourbon territorial sovereignty and England , France and Piedmont officially soon declared a “no” involvement policy. The real question for all concerned was Austria’s position. There was no love lost between Piedmont and Austria and Austria had traditionally often bolstered the Bourbon regime in its internal affairs.
The potential of Austria asserting support for the Bourbons and the threat of escalating the conflict to an international level continued to cause the Piedmont government to move forward cautiously and secretly. In early June a decision was made in the North to release 3,500 additional redshirt “volunteers” to Garibaldi and about half the rifles that were stockpiled. This could be maintained as an act beyond the control and authority of the Piedmont government. An act of spontaneous patriotism, nationalism and independent of government direction.
On June 8-11 th five ships left Genoa Italy with 3,500 volunteers and about 7,500 rifles for Cagliari, Sardinia where the staging for supporting Garibaldi could be organized without international observation. These troops were transported on five ships purchased by De Rohan, with secret Piedmont backing, for that purpose. De Rohan himself captained one of the three steam powered ships. During the transport on June 9th two of the non- steam powered ships, “the Utile” and “the Charles &Jane”, with 1,000 “volunteers were captured by the Bourbon navy. The ships and “volunteers were taken to the prison at Gaeta. However, the remainder of the ships and the rifles did make it to Cagliari and left there for Sicily on June 16th. These ships, on Garibaldi’s instruction, made for the Sicilian port of Castellamare about twenty-five miles from Palermo. The ships would arrive safely in Sicily on June 19th greatly enhancing Garibaldi’s military position with fresh and well trained armed men. Garibaldi now had about 3,000 of his original “redshirts” volunteers with him in Sicily.
It is during the time of this transport that an interesting and telling situation developed which helps illustrate the sort of internal politics that was present. I will write about that situation in the next installment.
© San Felese Society of New Jersey