The Fight for Unification Comes To the Mainland of Southern Italy


By: Tom Frascella                                                                                                                                        August 2015


 The War of Unification came to the southern Italian peninsula on August 17, 1860 when 2,000 poorly armed Lucanian insurgents lead by Nicolo Mignogna attacked and seized the Lucanian Capitol of Potenza from its 400 man Bourbon garrison. In the preceding two and a half years Lucanian insurgents had conducted a resistance campaign fighting in small bands from the Apennine Mountains. However, they had neither the weapons nor the political unity to define or conduct their struggle as a full scale political revolt. Most of the insurgents were fueled by the frustration of coping with the devastating earthquake of 1857 and the failure to provide help by the Neapolitan government. The insurgents were inspired by the July arrival and appearance in Basilicata of Nicolo Mignogna a long time southern Italian “Sons Young Italia” advocate. He had been sent by Garibaldi and was now acting as a Piedmont agent in the unification conflict. The Basilitacan insurgents were inspired by Garibaldi’s successes against the Bourbons in Sicily. At Mignogna urging Lucania’s insurgency began to organize, creating a growing force and movement within the Lucanian heartland. Within weeks of Mignogna arrival in Basilicata a plan was devised which culminated in the capture of Potenza. After a brief skirmish for control of Potenza, Basilicata became the only State in southern Italy, without external aid, to declare their independence from the Bourbon regime. After capturing the Capitol the insurgents went on to organize a provisional government and present a “declaration of annexation” to Piedmont. These actions took place a full two days prior to what would be Garibaldi’s landing date, August 19th on the southern mainland. The actions in Basilicata represented the only fully successful independent strike in the southern campaign. Its success was in no way related to Garibaldi’s landing which took place well over a hundred miles from Potenza two days later..

 The insurgent capture of Potenza and the strategic threat that it presented to the Bourbon regime was well understood by the Bourbon military. On August 18, 1860 1,000 Bourbon regulars were ordered out of Salerno with orders to retake Potenza and to reestablish Bourbon control over the State of Basilicata.

 Lucanian insurgents became aware of this troop movement and monitored the Bourbon troops as they advanced from the coastal plain of Compania into Lucania. On August 19, 1860 Nicolo Mignogna with his Lucanian insurgent force, which had swelled to 3,000, went on the offensive. They marched out of Potenza and toward the advancing Bourbon force. From their action it was clear to all of Basilicata and beyond that the Lucanians were set for direct confrontation and the preservation of their victory at Potenza.

 Also on August 19, 1860 the Italian War of Unification developed a second front on the southern Italian peninsula when Garibaldi landed his troops from Sicily in Calabria. The second front garners the lion’s share of history’s attention. Garibaldi, unopposed, landed his forces near the Calabrian coastal town of Melito. Garibaldi had taken with him for the landing about 5,000 men. Of those about 2,300 were northern “redshirts” and about 2,500 were Sicilian volunteers. Following the landing Garibaldi and his force remained bivouac at or near his landing site on the southern coast of Calabria for thirty-six hours. In part his staying on the beachhead was the result of the fact that Nino Bixio commander of the second transport, the steamship “Torino” had once again run his transport aground. Bixio had also run his transport at the landing on Sicily aground. Because of the scarcity of transport ships Garibaldi spent much of the first landing day trying to dislodge the beached vessel. He failed and the vessel was lost to the cause and ultimately destroyed by the Bourbon navy. This loss was significant in that more than half of the troops Garibaldi had available for the mainland campaign were still on Sicily. Although the Bourbon’s had about 16,000 troops in lower Calabria fortunately for Garibaldi the Bourbons failed to take the initiative and attack Garibaldi’s landing force while encamped on the beach near Melito.





                                                                                                  Photograph of the town of Auletta


 On August 20, 1860, while Garibaldi’s landing force remained on the beaches, the Bourbon force that was sent to retake Potenza reached the small Lucanian town of Auletta. As a geographic reference Auletta is considered one of the dozen surrounding towns that neighbor San Fele. So at this point the events were happening close to San Fele. Auletta had been substantially damaged in the earthquake of 1857 and a number of its residents were killed during the quake event. Again the lack of Neapolitan aid after the quake created no love of the Bourbon regime in Auletta. It is there in Auletta that the Bourbon forces came face to face with Mignogna’s advancing insurgent force, now swollen to 5,000-6,000 men. It should be noted that at this point only two days after Potenza fell on August 17th, the independent Lucanian insurgent force with Mignogna was already equal in size to Garibaldi’s entire landing force. In addition it was six times larger than the Bourbon force sent to defeat it. While it may have been poorly armed the Lucanian force had the advantage of numbers, knowledge of the terrain and was highly motivated as it was fighting for its homeland. The Bourbon force seeing the size of the force opposing them froze and refused commands from its officers to advance any further. Instead, possibly thinking the force was Garibaldi’s shouted out, “Vive Garibaldi”. The failure of these Bourbon troops to advance on the insurgents in Basilicata had major ramifications for the entire conduct of the rest of the military campaign in the south. This article will detail some of the events occurring in the southern Italian peninsula in the early stages of the military/political campaign specifically between August 19th and September 2, 1860. The immediate effect of this second failure to put down the Basilicatan insurgency was for the Naples high command to rush a force of “foreign” troops to Salerno.


                                           Garibaldi’s Psychological Preparation of his Landing Force


 For me an interesting starting point for the discussion of the events that unfolded would be with Garibaldi’s address delivered August 19, 1860 to his invading force while they were on board the two transport ships at Messina. Fortunately, that address was reported by the British press in attendance and a copy of it was reprinted in the New York Times of September 10, 1860. I will not reprint it all but one part referring to the anticipated struggle on the mainland is interesting and deserves highlighting. Garibaldi stated to his men:

 “This war of emancipation, so nobly commenced by you, is indebted for its success to the heroism and sympathy of the people. The movement which from Parco brought us to Gibil-Rossa, and from Gibil-Rossa to Palermo, namely, that which secured the liberation of the Sicilian capital, produced, I say, that splendid result, because the enemy could not be aware of it in spite of its numerous spies. This fact was the result of the affection of the Sicilian people for the holy cause we defend, and of the honorable behavior of our soldiery towards the inhabitants.

 Especial attention ought to be paid in order to secure concord between all the Italian provinces. Unhappily this truth, although recognized by all, has been practiced but by a few. The Italians of the north, more accustomed to the clang of arms, proud of victories already gained over the enemies of Italy, should fraternize with the younger soldiers of the south. They ought to share with them their experience, so as to embolden them by a friendly association. They ought to remember, above all, that in recent campaigns, Italy has seen that she can count upon all of her sons without exception. She can convince herself that Italian bravery has shone forth at all periods of its history—in the cold plains of Lombardy, Piedmont, and Venice, as well as upon the lava of its central or southern regions. Therefore it is not bravery that I need to recommend to the Italian soldier; but I must impress upon him with all the fervor of my soul the discipline of ancient Rome, an invariable harmony from one to another, and from province to province, besides a due respect for property, and above all for that of the poor peasantry, who suffer so much to gain the scanty bread of their families”.

 I find it interesting that Garibaldi’s words to his men, literally given hours before they were to land in Calabria are not aimed at inspiring the troops in the face of 80,000-100,000 Bourbon soldiers. Instead they are cautionary, almost paternalistic regarding how his troops should respond to the common southern Italian citizen. Clearly, Garibaldi was already expressing a concern which must have been based upon prior actions of his Piedmont troops during the Sicilian campaign. Generally, northern Piedmont troops considered themselves far superior to the Bourbon troops they encountered. Further they considered the Sicilian locals as little more than undisciplined, untrained militia. This attitude they apparently then transferred to the insurgents of the mainland. For example, the Calabrian insurgents who were supporting and keeping Missori’s exploratory force of 200 alive in the Calabrian highlands before Garibaldi’s landing were described by Garibaldi’s companions as follows;

 “The pitiful numbers of the invading force in Aspromonte were increased by small bands of Calabrian peasants, hardy mountaineers in goat-skin sandals, knee-breeches, shirt-sleeves, and brimless sugar-loaf hats ornamented with streamers of black velvet-the romantic Calabrian costume which opera-house and picture gallery of that era had made as familiar to cultured Europe as the kilt of Sir Walter Scott’s Highlanders. Their leader was Plutino, a local magnate jealous of the fame which his fellow-Calabrian Musolino had acquired in the province as leader of this expedition. Both Musolino and Plutino were feudal chiefs and political leaders rather than military men, and the command of the expedition was made over to Missori, the Lombard who had saved Garibaldi’s life at Milazzo. Under his spirited leadership these few hundred men kept the Neapolitan army perpetually on the qui vive. Every night they lighted a blaze of bonfires along the heights, to show their friends on the Sicilian shore that the insurrection was alive in Calabria. Once they came right down to the coast, captured Bagnara, and held it until driven out by several thousand troops. The Calabrians behaved well in this first skirmish.” (Garibaldi and the making of Italy, by George Trevelyan, page 113).

 Clearly, not the most glowing of descriptions for their new allies.

 It is worth noting that Garibaldi’s second in command Nino Bixio had just days before the landing returned from inflicting a rather heavy handed restoration of order in an around Bronte. Further, although not known to the Sicilian people Piedmont was in the process of landing about 20,000 northern troops by the end of August on Sicily to provide control of the Sicilian “liberated” population. It was clear that the Piedmont regime had already determined that it would need to “control” the populations now coming under its control. These actions have given rise to discussions among many historians of whether Garibaldi’s campaign was one of “liberation” or “occupation” of the south.

 But maybe Garibaldi’s cautionary words simply resulted from a problem of northern troop perception/prejudices of the southern Italian. Bixio was astonished at the lack of willingness of the civilian population on Sicily to defend itself, en masse, from either post victory lawlessness of from Bourbon tyranny. There were after all about two million Sicilians on the island. Yet probably less than 15,000 participated as fighters in the Sicilian campaign. In fact, the Sicilian population even after victory resisted conscription into the Sicilian National Guard. Garibaldi in a call for Guardsmen had trouble raising 10,000 conscripts on Sicily.

 Garibaldi himself remarked in his autobiography on the level of disappointment that only 2,500 Sicilian insurgents volunteered to cross on to the mainland to take up the cause of unification there. Most Sicilians expressing a feeling that it was not their fight.

 So, a part of Garibaldi’s remarks to his forces may have been in expectation that the Calabrians and other southern regional populations were likely to act as the Sicilians had and remain on the sidelines. However if that were the case his troops nevertheless needed to know that support of the population was important.

 The response of southern mainland Italians to Garibaldi’s arrival was very different than he experienced in Sicily. First, although coastal Calabrians held back after the initial landing, it is understandable with 16,000 Bourbon troops about. However, within those first thirty-six hours Garibaldi’s force was on the beach it was rejoined by the 200 man exploratory unit commanded by Missori that had been in the highlands. In addition 2,500 Calabrian mountain fighters also joined the landing force. The inland highlands of Calabria were in fact already largely controlled by Calabrian insurgents. These insurgents had prior to Garibaldi’s landing been organized by Piedmont agents sent over in July.  The agents were Calabrians and had local backgrounds. These men were recognized among the local insurgents as part of the “Sons of Young Italia” movement which existed in Calabria for decades. Histories recognize that the popular support for the unification was different in Calabria.

 “In the toe of Italy the presence of 16,000 troops prevented the insurrection from breaking out along the thickly populated coastline, and confined the movement to the wanderings of Missori’s bands in the heights of Aspromonte. But the province of Cosenza in Upper Calabria fell more or less into the hands of revolutionary committees in the first days of August, and the Basilicata followed suit on August 18. The movement in Calabria had been stirred up by the great local proprietors-the Plutino family, Stocco of the Thousand, Pace of Medici’s expedition, whom Garibaldi had sent on to their old homes to prepare the way before him. In the Basilicata a like part was played by Mignogna, also commissioned by Garibaldi”. (Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, by George Trevelyan pages 114-115)

 Once these “highland’ insurrectionists joined Garibaldi and his main force the northern soldiers got a different view of the quality and resolve of these “new” recruits to the cause.

 “The Calabrian Liberals were not altogether unworthy of such a deliverer. The Garibaldini, who had seen little to admire in the inhabitants of Eastern Sicily in spite of all the facile enthusiasm at Messina, declared that when they crossed the Straits they soon found themselves among “a staid, manly, athletic population”…

 The Calabrians of those days were not unaccustomed to war. For sixty years past they had from time to time conducted guerilla campaigns for and against the Bourbons… In 1848 the Calabrian peasants had upheld the national cause with valour that distinquished them among the populations of southern Italy.  In the reaction that followed, the leaders of the movement-doctors, professors, and landed proprietors-had gone into prison and into exile. Their day had now come. Francesco Stocco of the Thousand, their principal landlord of the Catanzaro district, reappeared among his own people, with the wound which he had received at Calatafimi yet unhealed. In 1860 feudal devotion was still strong in Calabria, and helped much to make the rising effective. Even in exile Stocco had been regarded as the real leader of the country, like a Highland chief living across the water after 1745. And now that he was among his people once more, they answered to his call as to that of a tribal King, who interpreted the will of Garibaldi the racial deity. Fortunately Stocco was a simple and disinterested man and used his authority well.” (Garibaldi and the Making of Italy, page 140).

 Late in the day of August 20th Garibaldi broke camp at Melito and climbed into the hillside toward the town and fortress of Reggio where 1,000 Bourbon troops of the 14th line were garrisoned.

 As Garibaldi was breaking camp in Calabria however, the more important military event was occurring in Basilicata.  The August 20th bloodless victory achieved by the Lucanians at Auletta and the retreat of the Bourbon troops from that region created a ripple effect throughout the Apennine Mountains and extending to Apulia. By stopping the advance of the Bourbon troops, Mignogna and his Lucanian force had effectively secured all of Lucania for the insurgents. Lucania/Basilicata represents about 20% of the land mass of southern Italy. Because it essentially is made up of the central mountainous core of the south it is sparsely populated. The Bourbons had never garrisoned large numbers of troops in the Lucanian Mountains as such a force would have had to spread out too far to effectively control the population. Basilicata’s population has few centers and the people primarily resided in scattered villages and towns, not cities. In addition a large force if garrisoned in the mountains now hostile to the force would be too exposed to attrition from sniper action from the mountain sides. So when Mignogna forced the Bourbon troops entering Lucania from Salerno back, Lucania was unguarded except for some small local Bourbon militia in isolated towns. When the Bourbons were stopped at Auletta, small insurgent bands from Avellino in the north all the way to the southern borders of Lucania/Basilicata seized control. For the most part without resistance and often being joined by the local Bourbon militias.

 The control of Basilicata effectively cut the remaining Bourbon mainland in three sections. This was because Basilicata controlled the mountain passes connecting the southern Kingdom. The three remaining sections were the Eastern coastal plan Apulia/Adriatic coast, Calabria, and the western coastal plain/Compania from Salerno northward.

 With the successful revolt in Basilicata/Lucania, the eastern coastal plain of Apulia rapidly understood the new reality of power. While there were some Bourbon troops garrisoned on the east coast they were now cut off from the main Bourbon army which was on the west coast. The garrisons recognized that they were cut off from resupply, reinforcements and retreat as the mountain passes were now under the control of the insurrection. When the insurgents on the Apulia rose up starting on August 20th the local Bourbon troops did not resist. Bourbon General Floras military commander of Apulia sent the following dispatch to Naples which was obtained and reprinted in the New York Times on military conditions in that region. This dispatch describes the situation that confronted the Bourbon garrisons isolated on the east Coast after Basilicata declared independence.

 “The day before yesterday an insurrection broke out in Foggia. The garrison, consisting of dragoons, made common cause with the people, crying “Viva Vittor Emmanuele!” “Viva Garibaldi”. I sent two companies of the Thirteenth Foot to put down the rebels, but they followed the example of the dragoons. I then proceeded personally to Foggia, and ordered the troops to leave the town. They appeared willing to obey, and assembled readily enough; but just as they were about to march, they turned around and fraternized with the people, so I had to return with my staff.” (N.Y. Times September 12, 1860)

 This turn of events left the Bourbon regime within just days of Garibaldi’s landing with approximately 80,000 men concentrated on the western coastal plain of the Kingdom. 16,000 of those troops were in Calabria where Garibaldi landed. Unfortunately for the Bourbons the narrow southwest corner of Basilicata divides Calabria from Compania. So the troops facing Garibaldi were cut off from the main body of the Bourbon army there as well. Mignogna’s main force was concentrated near the dividing line further isolating the Bourbons in Calabria. The Bourbon Commander in Calabria General Vial had set up his headquarters in Monteleone just below Mignogna’s position. Vial’s men were however, scattered along 50 miles of Calabrian coast.

 It should be recognized that with Basilicata and Apulia under insurgent control by August 20th represented about forty per cent of the southern peninsula’s mainland.So within one day of garibaldi’s landing a significant of the territory of the Bourbon Kingdom was already lost. This and Garibaldi had barely left the beach.

 With that setting Garibaldi began his advance in Calabria by leaving Melito and attacking the fortress and town of Reggio on August 21st. The Bourbon garrison at Regggio as previously mentioned had about 1,000 men.  The Bourbon sub-commander in charge at Reggio was General Gallotti who had positioned half of his men in the exposed center square of the town and half in the ancient fortress. For some reason Gallotti did not consider that the fortress and town could be successfully attacked. Throughout Garibaldi’s campaign it is often difficult to understand just how badly lead the Bourbon forces were. The failure of the Bourbon troops was not for lack of courage but lack of leadership.



                                                                                    Photograph of old town of Reggio, Calabria



 On the morning of August 21st Garibaldi’s forces attacked the Bourbon garrison at Reggio. Garibaldi lead between 2,000 and 3,000 men attacking the town from the mountain side and Bixio lead about 5,000 attacking from the lower coastal road. Garibaldi’s forces converged on the town square where 500 Bourbon troops, badly outnumbered, put up a stubborn and heroic defense. It was a bloody contest for the center of the town which saw many casualties including the Bourbon commander and his young son caught in the crossfire.

 After the town was taken there was the fortress to deal with. The fortress in Reggio in which General Gallotti concentrated his remaining soldiers was formidable in appearance and possessed sufficient stores to resist a siege of at least a month. However, the fortress is designed like many strongholds built in the region after the 16th century. It was built only halfway up the mountain. With the advent of long range accurate weapons, sharpshooters positioned above the fortress make the structures traps for soldiers garrisoned there.

 However, before that fortress design flaw could be exploited by Garibaldi, a Bourbon relief column under General Briganti of 2,000 men approached Reggio. Garibaldi, sent out his sharpshooters who after deploying caused the Bourbon column to retreat leaving Gallotti and his men stranded. With that Garibaldi commenced his attack on the fortress using his sharpshooters. Within 24 hours of beginning to pick off defenders of the fortress the Bourbon garrison surrendered. As a result by August 22, 1860 Garibaldi had eliminated 1,000 of the 16,000 Bourbon troops isolated in Calabria suffering only about 150 men lost himself.

 Also on August 21st Col. Consenz on orders from Garibaldi crossed over from Faro, Sicily with about 1,000 men and orders to join Garibaldi once the assault on Reggio had begun. This second landing which occurred at Syclla was successful however Consenz’s men had to fight their way inland sustaining heavy casualties in order to link up. On August 22rd Garibaldi after the surrender of the fortress at Reggio, with a combined force including Calabrians now of about 9,000 moved out toward the Bourbon troops encamped at the towns of Paile and nearby San Giovanni. In all the Bourbons had about 3,000 men in the two towns to face three times that number under Garibaldi. Had the commanders of the forces at these two towns retreated they would have been able to escape the enveloping movement that Garibaldi planned. However, the commanders were told directly by their commander General Vial that relief would be joining them there and that they should hold their positions..  No relief was sent and by August 23rd it was too late for them to retreat from Garibaldi’s forces which now surrounded them.

 Skipping the details, it suffices to say that these 3,000 Bourbon troops surrendered as they had no chance of escape and no expectation of rescue. Upon assurances from Garibaldi that they could either return home or join his cause if they surrendered, they surrendered. In this August 23rd surrender they turned over to Garibaldi all of their weapons and supplies, including artillery. They then were permitted to simply go home. By allowing these troops to leave without consequence Garibaldi had set the precedent that surrendering Bourbon troops would not be harmed, a psychological weapon that would serve him well. The surrender of this body of men meant that a full quarter of all of the Bourbon troops in Calabria had surrendered to Garibaldi by August 23rd and only 12,000 remained under the command of General Vial.


                                                                     A  New Phase in the Southern Campaign


 By August 23rd Garibaldi and his forces had won several early engagements against the Bourbon troops in Calabria and had firmly established his landing forces in the region by taking the offensive. Unlike Sicily the Calabrians had demonstrated a willingness to fight the Bourbons, many had fought a guerilla style resistance for years, but they lacked the weapons to do so effectively. In Basilicata and Apulia despite a lack of weapons insurgents in the thousands had successfully liberated the territories from Bourbon control. Garibaldi realized that he could call on tens of thousands of insurgents in the south. The four thousand weapons and equipment obtained from the surrendering Bourbons allowed Garibaldi to begin to equip a “peoples” army which was developing from Calabrian volunteers. This was an important option as Garibaldi had started his campaign in Calabria with a distinct disadvantage in weapons and manpower.

 Regarding weapons and the arming of his forces, it should be noted that there was a substantial upgrade of the weapons available to Garibaldi Piedmont forces which were rearmed on Sicily by the end of the Sicilian campaign. Despite the numerous books and articles which maintain the “non-involvement” of the British in Garibaldi’s and Piedmont’s campaign in the south there is an interesting note. That on July 31, 1860 the day after the surrender of the Bourbons at Milazzo, ending the Sicilian campaign, the manifest of the “Queen of England” departing England lists 1175 weapon cases containing 23,500 new enfield rifles and several rifled cannon for shipment. The ship and its cargo arrived at Messina on August 15, 1860. (Appendix E page 330 Garibaldi and the Making of Italy). This is four days before Garibaldi’s landing on the mainland.

 After the surrender of the 3,000 Bourbon forces under General Briganti and Melendez, Garibaldi turned his attention back to the fortresses that guarded the narrow straits of Messina. Cut off they surrendered without a fight allowing the approximately 6,000 Redshirts that had now been ferried to Sicily from Piedmont to cross over to Calabria without threat from the fortress artillery. Garibaldi at this point on August 25th had a force with him in Calabria of about 11,000 northerners, 2,500 Sicilians and 2,500 Calabrians facing 12,000 Bourbons at or near Monteleone under General Vial.

 As Garibaldi prepared his force to move toward the forces of General Vial, the insurgent commander and Piedmont agent Stucco organized an uprising in his native stronghold at Catanzaro. On August 26th the people of Catanzaro rose up against the Bourbon garrison and disarmed it. Stucco then lead a force to Campo Lungo by the bridge at Angitola. Stucco’s force was probably made up about 2,000 local Calabrian insurgents. They took up a position above/north Vial’s forces encampment at Monteleone and cut of the route that Vial’s force would have to take if it attempted to retreat. This was accomplished two days before Garibaldi’s forces reached the area. As Garibaldi advanced General Vial received orders from Naples to retreat back to Naples, however the land road was cut off by Stucco and he perceived his only escape route was the sea. Vial had only one steam transport available. He boarded the vessel with 1,000 his men and sailed back to Naples. He left 11,000 men at Monteleone under the command of General Ghio with orders to fight their way back to Naples. 1,000 of those troops deserted almost immediately.

 General Ghio marched his 10,000 men out of Monteleone and across the bridge at Angitola. Apparently some miscommunication occurred and the insurgents thought that the retreat was sanctioned by Garibaldi. When Garibaldi heard of the escape he rushed northward ahead of his force. Garibaldi did not want 10,000 well-armed Bourbon troops freely in Calabria. Fortunately, two days later he caught up the Ghio’s force below the pass at Agrifoglio. Ghio had halted his retreat when he found out that a second insurgent Calabrian force lead by feudal chiefs Morelli and Pace with about 3,000 were holding the pass and blocking his advance. Garibaldi quickly ordered Stucco force northward to trap Ghio’s force between the two Calabrian insurgent groups.

 On August 30th Garibaldi ordered the 2,000 Calabrians under Stucco to advance on Ghio’s force. The Bourbon force did not resist and surrendered their weapons and deserted. The fight for Calabria was over.

 Later in the day Garibaldi made his way to the town of Consenza. It is there that he learned that Bertani had now landed with 1,500 Piedmont troops in Calabria by transport. Bertani made his way to Garibaldi at Consenza. Garibaldi sent Col. Turr to take over command of Bertani’s troops and redirect them and the transports to a landing at Sapri in lower Compania. Garibaldi, Consenz and bertani then travelled without escort through upper Calabria and were warmly greeted by the Calabrians who viewed him as a liberator. He was particularly well received by the many Albanian communities in the region. Garibaldi himself being of Albanian-Italain origin felt special affinity and dependence on ethnic Albanians in his campaign. On September 2, 1860 Garibaldi, with only a few companions in tow passed from Calabria into southwest Basilicata on route to the town of Rotonda, Potenza.


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